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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) has caused a revolutionary
paradigm shift in computer networking. After decades of human-centered
routines, where devices were merely tools that enabled human beings to
authenticate themselves and perform activities, we are now dealing with
a device-centered paradigm: the devices themselves are actors, not just
tools for people. Conventional identity access management (IAM) frame-
works were not designed to handle the challenges of IoT. Trying to use
traditional IAM systems to reconcile heterogeneous devices and complex
federations of online services (e.g., IoT sensors and cloud computing so-
lutions) adds a cumbersome architectural layer that can become hard
to maintain and act as a single point of failure. In this paper, we pro-
pose UniquID, a blockchain-based solution that overcomes the need for
centralized IAM architectures while providing scalability and robustness.
We also present the experimental results of a proof-of-concept UniquID
enrolment network, and we discuss two different use-cases that show the
considerable value of a blockchain-based IAM.
Keywords: IAM · Identity management systems · Blockchain · Internet
of Things · IoT · Machine-to-machine · M2M
1 Introduction
Information Technology (IT) has radically changed throughout history. In just
a few decades, computers evolved from bulky, standalone machines that filled
rooms to small and powerful devices capable of gathering information from other
devices over the Internet. This explosion of capabilities has led to a concomitant
expansion of complexity in a variety of areas, including identity access manage-
ment (IAM).
Conventional IAM systems are essential for traditional local networks and
businesses, but not well-suited for large networks of complex, highly distributed
devices, such as the combination of Internet of Things (IoT) and machine to
machine (M2M) communication. The main reason is that IAM systems were
designed for human beings, not devices. Until a decade ago, a typical scenario
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involved a known number of terminals and a comparable number of human users
with well-defined roles. Accounts were issued for each person and access rights
stored on a central server, making access control (AC) relatively easy to manage.
Today, IT is much more complex than it once was.
The Internet of Things is causing the old user-centered paradigm to shift
toward a device-centered one. Previously, accounts were tied to human beings
and devices were just a means to the end of accomplishing all of the tasks
those humans performed. Today, devices are increasingly becoming the actors
themselves, with the tasks narrowed down from general purpose functions to very
specific operations. With this in mind, traditional IAM solutions are expensive,
make maintaining cross-domain consistency challenging, and represent a critical
single point of failure in organizations due to their centralized nature.
In the 1990s, PKI was considered one of the key technologies for dealing
with security issues and enabling trust among parties [5]. But adoption of the
technology never took off as envisioned, due to critical issues such as privacy
and liability concerns, management complexity, and high costs. PKI technology
is compartmentalized by design, as shown in Figure 1, and therefore irremediably
ill-suited for devices that need cross-domain interactions or technical solutions
that rely upon the federation of independent services. PKI lacks the flexibility
needed for IoT and M2M, whereas certificate-based authentication is well-suited
for these uses.
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Fig. 1: PKIs inherently introduce compartmentalization, which increases the
complexity of identity reconciliation over cross-domain federated architectures.
In this example, the identity of a single Internet-enabled car has to be separately
managed by several different PKIs.
This paper describes UniquID 4, a solution based on an infrastructure that
takes advantage of certificates and blockchain technology to overcome the diffi-
culties in reconciling IoT credentials and cross-domain IAM. The goals of this
paper include the following:
– Describing a cheaper and simpler alternative to traditional IAM systems.
– Illustrating the implementation of cross-domain identities for IoT devices to
circumvent account reconciliation.
4 http://www.uniquid.com
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– Showing how the proposed design removes single points of failure from the
trust structure.
– Demonstrating direct peer-to-peer (P2P) authentication and authorization
among IoT devices.
– Showing how an IoT device, empowered to locally confirm a smart transac-
tion, deals with partitioning issues as defined by the CAP Theorem.
1.1 Paper Outline
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the main players in
the blockchain-based IAM landscape, how UniquID addresses some of the dis-
tributed IoT challenges, and how it is linked to the CAP Theorem. Section 3
describes the general concepts behind UniquID, and Section 4 shows the ex-
perimental evaluation of an enrolment proof-of-concept. Section 5 describes two
example case studies, and Section 6 lays out the paper conclusions and discusses
future work.
2 Related Work
In the past, blockchain has already been advocated for more secure IAM systems.
For example, Kshetri [11] suggests that blockchain can help in strengthen the IoT
in different ways, such as preventing DDoS and IP spoofing attacks. Furthermore,
Gartner estimates that by 2020 the IoT will require up to 1000 times the 2016
network capacity [13]. This entails that the centralized IAM paradigm might not
scale enough to tolerate such requirements, and this is where the decentralized
IAM can provide both more security and scalability.
In Roman et al. [17], the authors lay out the main challenges of distributed
IoT. They argue that identity and authentication are primary concerns due
to the inherent dynamism introduced by device mobility, unstable connections,
and related problems. Throughout this paper, we show how UniquID provides
direct identification and authentication, which in turn enables efficient M2M
resource negotiation. Another issue raised is security, which UniquID ensures
through asymmetric encryption, adding symmetric cipher-based encryption for
larger data streams. Furthermore, depending on the chosen backbone , privacy
can be partially or even totally lost. In cases where privacy is needed, it can be
enforced through non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs such as zk-SNARKs [18]
and Bulletproofs [4], but this involves considerable overhead that may not be
appropriate for resource-constrained devices.
Several parallel projects have been proposed to address the problem of iden-
tity management over blockchain, yet most of them do not address the access
management part. For example, IBM Hyperledger Indy aims to provide an SDK
solution to manage identities over distributed ledgers [7]. Even though UniquID
similarly provides an SDK, our proposal addresses both the identity and access
management parts of the equation, whereas Indy addresses only identity.
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Scholars proposed some solutions as well. Le and Mutka propose CapChain [12],
a blockchain-based access control framework that enables IAM on public blockchains,
ensuring at the same time privacy; in particular, the authors built a proof-of-
concept over Monero source code and ran processing time local benchmarks.
Ouaddah et al. [16] propose a blockchain-based access control named FairAc-
cess, and implemented a proof-of-concept which uses Bitcoin OP RETURN as a
storage field. Finally, Novo [15] proposes a blockchain-based access management
that utilizes a management hub (e.g., an edge node) as a middlepoint between
IoT devices and the blockchain.
Even though all the aforementioned papers prove that blockchain-based IAM
is possible, they lack a thorough discussion on how the underlying blockchain
choice can deeply affect operational costs, data immutability, immediacy, and
efficiency. Moreover, none of such works envisage a way to verify a policy with-
out Internet connection, failing to take full advantage of the M2M paradigm.
In particular, no one highlights the strong relationship between Brewer’s CAP
Theorem and IAM solutions, nor motivations and implications of choosing con-
sistency over availability (or vice-versa) in their proposals.
2.1 Consistency, Availability, and Partition Tolerance (CAP)
According to Brewer’s CAP Theorem [3], one cannot ensure all three of the
following in a system at any given time: consistency (C), availability (A) and
partition tolerance (P). CAP is often misunderstood, with people thinking that
a distributed system is always unable to assure all three requirements. In real-
ity, the choice is only between consistency and availability when a partition or
a failure occurs; under normal circumstances, all three can be assured simulta-
neously. Another misunderstanding is about consistent-available (CA) systems,
which are simply not possible in a distributed scenario. According to CAP, a
system could be designed to be CA, but it would require a network that ensures
no packet is ever dropped at any moment in time. For a fixed partition tolerance
requirement, the only real choice is between consistency and availability.
Consistency, which is a property related to read operation, can be either
strong or eventual. In a consistent-partition-tolerant (CP) scenario typical of an
RDBMS, the system ensures that every commit to the database is propagated
and kept consistent throughout all database replicas, so that every read opera-
tion returns the most recently updated result. In an available-partition-tolerant
(AP) scenario typical of NoSQL, the read operation does not ensure that the
user receives the most up-to-date result. But even though AP sounds problem-
atic, consistency is eventually achieved, and this approach is common in many
non-critical applications due to its strong support for partition tolerance and
availability.
It is important to keep in mind that partitions and latency are strongly
related, to the point that we can define a partition as a function of latency: the
developer can decide the latency threshold beyond which partitioning occurs. By
indefinitely retrying communications, one is essentially choosing a CP solution
over an AP one, whereas replying right away to a user request means choosing
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AP over CP, as the data might be stale (inconsistent with the current state).
The idea of selecting either CP or AP is a false dichotomy, however, as tuning
the time threshold makes it possible to switch from a CP solution to an AP one
after a chosen amount of time.
UniquID aims to provide similar flexibility depending on the application do-
main. This can be easily done by deciding for how long an IoT device will try to
download an up-to-date smart contract from the blockchain (i.e., CP behavior)
before conceding the resources to the client based on the locally stored smart
contract (i.e., AP behavior). In this particular case, the IoT device is a Uniq-
uID node that can locally read a smart contract even though it does not store
the whole blockchain. The ability to locally read a smart contract means that
any network failure happening between the node and the rest of the UniquID
network is a partition. Therefore, the CAP theorem applies and a thoughtful
decision must be made between consistency and availability.
3 UniquID Overall Architecture
Figure 2 shows how different networks interact with each other in a traditional
IAM infrastructure. An IoT device in Network A must go through the IAM
platform to authenticate on a different IoT network, such as Network B. In the
event of network unavailability, a device cannot authenticate, showing that this
solution does not provide good availability.
Traditional IAM Platform
IoT Network B
IoT Device1 IoT Device2 IoT Devicen
Secure Gateway
IoT Network A
IoT Device1 IoT Device2 IoT Devicen
Secure Gateway
Fig. 2: Traditional IAM systems impose a hierarchical structure over managed
devices. This introduces potential single points of failure in the architecture and
strongly impedes direct M2M communications.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, this kind of architecture involves a con-
siderable number of message exchanges. This overhead decreases the overall re-
sponsiveness of the system and means that it cannot ensure availability in the
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event of network partitioning. Indeed, we can classify a traditional IAM architec-
ture as CP-compliant without any possibility of choosing an AP solution. This
system was acceptable in the old days of fixed and stable architectures, but IoT
networks require greater flexibility and interoperability.
EntityB AuthServerEntityA
  obtainResource1Token
obtainResource1
tokenRequired
giveResource1Token
giveResource1Token
giveResource1
Fig. 3: With traditional IAM systems, resource negotiation between a requestor
(EntityA) and a provider (EntityB) involves an additional exchange between
EntityA and an authentication server (AuthServer).
A primary goal of UniquID is to replace traditional IAM structures with a
less expensive architecture that is more flexible and easier to manage. As shown
in Figure 4, the system uses an infrastructure where devices can directly authen-
ticate each other without a trusted third party IAM platform, as envisioned by
the PGP Web of Trust [6,8].
Figure 5 shows the UniquID workflow, illustrating two main differences from
the IAM setup depicted in Figure 3. First of all, fewer messages are required
than in a traditional approach, which entails that UniquID provides better per-
formances than a centralized IAM, assuming that AuthServer and Blockchain
have comparable response times. Second, and more important, the entities use
smart contracts stored in a tamper-proof public blockchain instead of tokens.
This not only ensures higher security but also enables Entity B to store the
contract so it can still authenticate Entity A in the event of a network failure.
This might pose some security issues. Suppose a malicious person M steals
Entity A, the laptop of an important CEO. The network administrator imme-
diately revokes all Entity A permissions by issuing a blockchain transaction.
If Entity B is instructed to allow authentication without double-checking the
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IoT Network A
IoT Device1 IoT Device2 IoT Devicen
Secure Gateway
IoT Network B
IoT Device1 IoT Device2 IoT Devicen
Secure Gateway
Fig. 4: UniquID removes the authentication server, which has two important
implications. First, the potential single point of failure disappears from the net-
work. Second, scalability greatly improves, as M2M communication is possible
and a central authority is no longer essential for negotiation.
currentness of the permission, M might try to gain as much time as possible
to cause damage by initiating a network fault that isolates Entity B from the
blockchain. This would enable M to authenticate despite the staleness of the
Entity A permissions stored within Entity B.
At the same time, the ability to verify a smart contract offline might be in-
valuable for some other applications. Take as an example a public transportation
service. Assume that user U pays for a one-hour ride ticket that allows him to
take any city bus line he likes. Assume that the city buses pull this ticket from
the blockchain, and temporarily store it locally. After U has done all his errands,
he goes to the bus stop and tries to get on the bus, but a network fault occurs. If
the buses have been configured to authenticate him without double-checking the
current status of the ticket on the blockchain, U will be able to board the bus.
If, on the other hand, the buses need to perform a double-check, U will be left
waiting until the network fault is resolved, which might take a long time. Again,
a malicious user M might isolate the bus he is boarding and extend his ticket for
some time. However, this is a small economic risk that the company would be
willing to take given the more serious consequences that a network fault would
have on all of its transportation infrastructure.
Each scenario has different requirements. One of the strengths of UniquID
is that the end users can decide whether a CP system or an AP system is best
suited to their needs.
3.1 Imprinting Ceremony
With the goal of excluding any kind of PKI, we envision an approach similar to
the Web of Trust paradigm [6,8] for the node initialization phase. In UniquID,
the imprinting ceremony resembles a PGP key-signing party. To be enrolled in
UniquID, every node must be initialized, which happens in different phases. To
minimize the chances of man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, the following steps
should take place as soon as possible in the production chain.
8 A. Giaretta et al.
EntityB BlockchainEntityA
  obtainContractA,B
obtainResource1
giveContractA,B
giveResource1
Fig. 5: UniquID communication is more straightforward than in traditional IAM.
EntityA can negotiate for resources directly with EntityB, which can interrogate
the blockchain to confirm that the request is valid. But this interrogation is not
mandatory, since EntityB can store hash trees and locally confirm certificate
validity thanks to the Merkle tree data structure.
First of all, each node generates its own public key, which is directly (i.e., not
through the Internet) exchanged with other devices in the same local network.
After this phase is complete, the identities are stored in a blockchain through
the imprinting process. An imprinter is a node designated to collect all the new
identities, and forward them to the blockchain of choice.
In details, the imprinter is appointed to perform some critical tasks. First,
the imprinter generates a special smart contract, the imprinting contract (IC),
which links the device to the public key of its administrator. Once the generation
is done, the imprinter collects the ICs and announces them to the blockchain, in
order to ensure data immutability. From this moment on, these enrolled devices
are able to interact with the UniquID infrastructure. If the device is transferred
to another entity (e.g., sold to a customer), the administrator (e.g., the man-
ufacturer) signs a contract and transfers the administrative rights by replacing
its public key with that of the new owner. Ideally, due to the critical role of the
imprinter, the manufacturer deploys a number of different imprinting nodes, to
both speed up the imprinting process, and to avoid single point of failures in the
architecture.
In Figure 6, we show the main tasks performed during the imprinting phase.
After that a node has created its identity (i.e., the public key), it announces it
to the imprinter which is appointed to create the IC and to communicate it to
the blockchain. At that point, the IC will go under the underlying blockchain
processes, until it will be included in a new block and become almost immutable.
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Imprinter BlockchainClient
generateIdentity
announceICs 
generateIC
generateNewBlock
OtherUniquID 
Nodes 
exchangeKeys
announceIdentity
exchangeKeys
Fig. 6: Sequence diagram that depicts a standard imprinting ceremony.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental results of a UniquID enrolment
instance, executed on a cloud service. Even though we measured the performance
of the identity generation phase, as well as the imprinting phase, our goal is
not to assess the performance of such instance. Indeed, the system scalability
is tightly tied to the utilized resources, and the small setup we used for our
experiments cannot represent a fully operating UniquID network. The aim of
these experiments is to show that our solution is feasible, and that it successfully
stores immutable identities on a public blockchain. On a larger scale, this would
be enough to make PKIs, passwords, and certificates unnecessary.
To perform our experiments, we created 7 parallel clients, designated to gen-
erate 1000 virtual IoT identities and communicate such identities to 1 imprinting
node. Every identity is announced as soon as it is created, and the receiving im-
printing node is appointed both to create the IC transactions and forward them
to the Litecoin Testnet blockchain. Imprinter and clients ran over AWS T2.Micro
instances, burstable performance instances equipped with 1 Gb of RAM. As a
communication protocol between the imprinter and the clients, we used MQTT
(Message Queue Telemetry Transport), an ISO standard (ISO/IEC PRF 20922)
publish-subscribe-based messaging protocol [10], designed for lightweight com-
munications.
As aforementioned, we chose Litecoin as a storing public blockchain, which
ensures one mined block every 2.5 minutes. Considering that a Litecoin block
is 1 Mb and that a UniquID transaction is 400 byte, this design choice entails
a theoretical upper bound of 2500 enrolled devices per 2.5 minutes, or 1000
devices per minute. More in general, we can define the theoretical upper bound
of enrolments per minute with the following equation:
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Block Size (bytes)
400 (bytes) · Average Mining T ime (m) , (1)
where 400 bytes are the size of a UniquID transaction, and the other parameters
depend on the underlying blockchain.
4.1 Identity Generation
In the first evaluation phase, we measured the time required to generate an
identity on a virtual client. As shown in Figure 7a, on average it took 6.61±0.03
milliseconds to generate an identity.
As stated before, in our experiments we delegated the generation task to the
virtual clients. In an ideal scenario, the IoT devices would create and announce
their identity themselves, therefore we performed an additional experiment, in
order to evaluate the generation time on a low power device. The device we used
was equipped with an arm926ejste CPU, 256 MB RAM, and a mlinux 3.3.6 OS.
On this IoT device, the generation process took 627 milliseconds, 44.7% of CPU
and 0.4% of RAM. The footprint left on the device storage was 6.70 MB.
While the generation time of 627 milliseconds is substantially higher than
the one obtained with a virtual client (6.61 ± 0.03 milliseconds, as showed in
Figure 7a), generating an identity well under 1 second is still an excellent result.
Moreover, the resources used by the whole process are reasonably low and the
resulting footprint is small enough to fit into any modern IoT device.
4.2 Imprinting
As a second part of our experiment, we analysed and measured the necessary
time to imprint new identities on a public blockchain. As aforementioned, our
experimental setup is composed by 6 clients that created 1000 identities, and
announced them to a single imprinter node. Again, the imprinter has the role to
create an IC transaction for each identity and submit all the transactions to the
blockchain. In Figure 7b, we show that the average time to imprint one identity
is 9.06 ± 0.35 minutes.
Our experiments clearly show that the imprinting took a considerably longer
time than the generation of the identities. The former took minutes, whereas the
latter took milliseconds.
4.3 Summing Up: Enrolment
Our experiments show that, in total, it took around 4.5 hours to automatically
enrol (i.e., create, announce, and imprint) 1000 identities, without any human
intervention. The reason why this practical result is considerably under the the-
oretical upper bound of 1000 enrolments per minute, is that our virtual clients
on Amazon AWS could open no more than 5 concurrent sockets, per each. This
resulted in a bottleneck, where already generated identities were announced with
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Fig. 7: Average times for generating and imprinting identities, respectively.
considerable delays. Figure 8 shows the magnitude of this bottleneck: on average,
it took 115.86 ± 2.19 minutes to announce an identity to the imprinter, which
is a significant amount of time compared to the time for identity generation
(6.61 ± 0.03 milliseconds) and imprinting (9.06 ± 0.35 minutes).
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100
125
150
Announcing Identity
Fig. 8: Average time to announce one identity. Announce time is in minutes,
error bar shows the Standard Error (SE).
Internal Experiment. In order to further investigate this communication bot-
tleneck, we ran some internal tests with exactly the same network setup. These
tests showed that we can easily run up to 50 concurrent threads per MQTT
client, overcoming the communication bottleneck and increasing our capacity to
400 enrolments per minute. Still, at the present stage UniquID does not enable
us to get near the theoretical upper bound, but this is purely due to software
limitations that are currently addressed.
To sum up, our experiments successfully show that is possible to automati-
cally enrol IoT devices in a blockchain-based IAM. In practice, this means that
enrolled devices no longer need to rely upon PKIs, centralized CA authorities,
certificates, nor passwords. Moreover, our experiments lead to immutable iden-
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tities, publicly verifiable by anyone on the Litecoin Testnet 5. Once showed that
our approach works in practice, the next step will be to optimise the performance
to get as close as possible to the theoretical upper bound.
5 Case Studies
In this section, we present a couple of case studies to highlight UniquID strengths
and variety of applications.
5.1 Smart Vehicle
Let us assume a connected vehicle with 3G cellular capability and a mobile app
designed to unlock the doors or start the engine. In a typical scenario, the smart-
phone app connects to a RESTful cloud service responsible for authenticating
the user and forwarding the command to the vehicle, leveraging an encrypted
session pushed through an available 3G connection. This architecture presents
three main issues:
– In the absence of 3G signal coverage, the cloud service cannot perform any
remote command and control of the vehicle, leaving the user locked out [2].
– In large-scale deployments, the cloud service becomes the main bottleneck of
the system, introducing latency and potential downtime during peak hours.
– Every vehicle-side application is exposed to Internet connectivity and thus
must be maintained against zero-day vulnerabilities and malware and ran-
somware attacks [9].
UniquID allows the two endpoints (i.e., the smartphone and vehicle) to in-
dependently synchronize with the ledger, leveraging the hashcash PoW cost-
function [1] to verify the integrity of a new block. Moreover, transactions stored
as Merkle tree leaves allow efficient verification of the veracity of a new autho-
rization [14].Once this information is locally stored on both ends, handshake
and authorization are performed through low-energy and proximity protocols
(e.g., BLE) without relying on Internet connectivity or remote command-and-
control services, as previously shown in Figure 5. Figure 9 shows the resulting
architecture.
5.2 Industrial Sensor Network
Consider an industrial Internet application where a large network of remotely
installed, battery-operated sensors collect time series data in a low-connectivity
environment. These sensors do not have cellular signal coverage, and satellite
uplink is not a feasible option. The data from these sensors is periodically ”har-
vested” by human operators through a portable device, such as a laptop or
rugged tablet, using an ad-hoc Wi-Fi connection to the sensors. This architec-
ture presents two main challenges:
5 For instance, the first enrolment is verifiable at: https://testnet.litecore.io/
tx/feac5a1dc645c701ea17ceb1657541d7094fbb43f18749cd9bd8a54014bd0197
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Smart Vehicle
Blockchain
Smartphone
Independent synchronization  Independent synchronization 
Offline Verification
Fig. 9: UniquID enables M2M offline verification of smart contracts, which makes
possible to start a loaned smart vehicle even in case of network failure.
– IAM for the sensors is achieved through Wi-Fi passwords, which require
complex maintenance and periodic rotation (e.g., in case of operator change).
– Multi-tenancy scenarios require an additional layer of authentication at the
application level, which needs to manage passwords stored on the sensor
itself.
UniquID approach pushes the storage of these credentials onto the distributed
ledger, enabling a remotely controlled, asynchronous IAM solution. A typical im-
plementation leverages a central orchestration interface that sends microtrans-
actions containing the ACL between one sensor and its authorized users on the
distributed ledger. As a result, no passwords are needed: combining the ledger
pseudonymous identity from the wallets (installed on the operator’s device and
the sensor), and blockchain-stored transactions that contain the ACLs, a sen-
sor can recognize the operator’s device and provide the data that the user is
authorized to collect.
Furthermore, the operator acts as the dispatcher of the most recent blocks
on the ledger. PoW is sufficient to verify the integrity of any received block,
reducing the risk of forged blocks (which would require network consensus) and
removing the need for a trusted session between peers. In this way, even if always
disconnected from the Internet, sensors can be kept up to date with the latest
authorizations stored on the ledger. Figure 10 shows the resulting architecture.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we first briefly covered why current IAM systems and PKIs are
too cumbersome for the challenges posed by the IoT paradigm. We also showed
how the CAP theorem strongly applies to blockchain-based IAMs, and how
developers can independently decide how their applications react to network
partitions.
We illustrated the overall UniquID architecture and how its SDK aims to
simplify both the trust architecture as a whole and resource negotiation flows.
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Blockchain
Offline Communication
Human OperatorSensor2
Sensor1
Sensorn
Fig. 10: UniquID enables a human operator to authenticate against non-
connected sensors. Furthermore, the user dispatches to the sensors the latest
blocks of the shared ledger.
We also discussed in detail how the backbone architecture of a blockchain-based
IAM can be designed, as well as the benefits and drawbacks of each solution.
We provided an overview of the essential features that devices need to imple-
ment to participate in UniquID, as well as how the initial imprinting ceremony
of such devices happens. We performed a proof-of-concept experiment which led
to generating and imprinting 1000 identities on the Litecoin Testnet, virtually
immutable and publicly verifiable by anyone. Last, but not least, we provided
two relevant case studies that showed how UniquID could help unlock the poten-
tial of IoT. In future works we will conduct extensive experiments to assess the
robustness and responsiveness of UniquID under a number of adverse conditions,
such as man-in-the-middle and denial-of-service attacks.
Having shown the feasibility of our approach through practical experiments,
future work will focus on optimising the performance of the system to get as
close as possible to the theoretical upper bound of 1000 enrolled devices per
minute.
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